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Transformative Events in the LGBTQ Rights Movement
Ellen Ann Andersen*
ABSTRACT
Obergefell v. Hodges, the 2015 Supreme Court case holding that same-sex couples had a
constitutional right to marry under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
was widely hailed in the media as a turning point for the LGBTQ rights movement. In this
article, I contemplate the meaning of turning points. Social movement scholars have shown
that specific events can, on rare occasion, alter the subsequent trajectory of a social
movement. Such events have been termed ‘transformative events.’ I ask whether judicial
decisions have the capacity to be transformative events and, if so, under what circumstances.
I begin by developing a set of criteria for identifying a transformative event which I then
apply to a handful of judicial decisions that, like Obergefell, have been described widely as
turning points and/or watersheds in the struggle for LGBTQ rights. I show that judicial
decisions do indeed have transformative capacities; that they can trigger dramatic and
enduring shifts in social movements. In so doing, I add to the growing body of scholarship
examining the relationship between judicial decisions and social movement progress.

INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court handed down Obergefell v. Hodges, 1
holding that same-sex couples had a constitutional right to marry under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Media reporting on the case was quick
to emphasize its historic significance. For example, a New York Times editorial
published the day after the decision proclaimed that Obergefell belonged next to
Brown v. Board of Education2 and Loving v. Virginia3 in the pantheon of “landmark
Supreme Court decisions reaffirming the power and scope of the Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection under the law.”4 Other contemporaneous reports and
editorials echoed this assessment, variously referring to Obergefell as a “watershed,”5

*
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Associate Professor of Political Science and Gender, Sexuality, and Women’s Studies at the University
of Vermont. My sincere thanks to the organizers of and participants in the Indiana Journal of Law and
Social Equality’s 2016 Symposium on turning points in social movements past and future. I
particularly want to thank Michael McCann and Scott Barclay for their insights and Tori Staley for her
research assistance.
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Editorial, Marriage Equality in America, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2015, at 20.
Editorial, Upholding the Rule of Law, WASH. POST, July 1, 2015, at A18.
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a “milestone,”6 a “transformative event,”7 and “a historic culmination of decades of
litigation.”8
While we academics are slower to produce text than journalists, an emerging
body of scholarly writing likewise treats Obergefell as an extraordinary moment in
the movement for LGBTQ rights. Jeremiah Ho calls the case “the watershed civil
rights decision of our time.”9 Toni Jaeger-Fine also views Obergefell as a watershed,10
while Loren L. Cannon argues that the decision is “a turning point in our nation’s
history and its recognition of the value of lesbian and gay identities and
relationships.”11
My aim in this Article is to take the language of turning points and watersheds
seriously. Social movement scholars have argued that events can, on occasion, change
the trajectory of social movements in enduring fashions. In the words of McAdam and
Sewell, transformative events are “specific and systematically explicable
transformations and re-articulations of the cultural and social structures that were
already in operation before the event.”12 In essence, transformative events “produce
radical turning points in collective action and affect the outcome of social
movements.”13
Social movement scholars have chiefly been interested in the capacity of
transformative events to dramatically increase or decrease mass mobilization.14 But
Aldon Morris’s case study of the Montgomery bus boycott shows that transformative
events can have other enduring effects as well. While the boycott did indeed spark
massive mobilization by the African American community in Montgomery, it also
“introduced and perfected an effective tactic, catapulted a charismatic leader into the
forefront of the movement . . . sustained a movement for a considerable period of time,
and produced a victory” as well as “launch[ed] the modern civil rights movement.”15
6
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Richard Wolf & Brad Heath, Supreme Court Strikes Down Bans on Same-Sex Marriage, USA TODAY
(June 26, 2015, 10:05 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/06/26/supreme-court-gaylesbian-marriage/28649319/.
Warren Richey, Gay Marriage Ruling Leaves Debate About Religious Liberty Wide Open, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR (July 5, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2015/0705/Gay-marriageruling-leaves-debate-about-religious-liberty-wide-open.
Gay Marriage: Supreme Court Extends Same-Sex Marriage Nationwide, DENVER POST, June 26, 2015,
at 0Z.
Jeremiah A. Ho, Once We’re Done Honeymooning: Incrementalism, and Advances for Sexual Orientation
Anti-discrimination, 104 KY. L. J. 207 (2016).
Toni Jaeger-Fine, Marriage Equality in the United States: A Look at Obergefell and Beyond, 3 REV. DE
INVESTIGAÇÕES CONSTITUCIONAIS 7 (2016).
Loren L. Cannon, Privileges, Priorities, and Possibilities After Marriage Equality, NEWS. ON LGBTQ
ISSUES IN PHIL. (Am. Philosophical Ass’n), 2015, at 2.
Doug McAdam & William H. Sewell Jr, It’s About Time: Temporality in the Study of Social Movements
and Revolutions, in SILENCE AND VOICE IN THE STUDY OF CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 89, 102 (2001).
Aldon Morris, Reflections on Social Movement Theory: Criticisms and Proposals, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 445,
452 (2000).
See generally Miniya Chatterji, The Globalization of Politics: From Egypt to India, 12 SOC. MOVEMENT
STUD. 96 (2013); David Hess & Brian Martin, Repression, Backfire, and the Theory of Transformative
Events, 11 MOBILIZATION INT’L 249 (2006).
Morris, supra note 13 at 452–53.
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The 1969 Stonewall Riots similarly show that transformative events can have
multiple enduring effects on the history of a social movement. The riots certainly
served as a catalyst for widespread mobilization. Approximately fifty gay-related
organizations existed nationwide at the time of Stonewall; four years later such
organizations numbered in excess of 800. 16 But the impact of Stonewall extended
beyond sheer numbers. Many of the people mobilized in Stonewall’s aftermath had
cut their activist teeth in the civil rights, women’s liberation, and antiwar
movements. When they turned their attention to the cause of “gay liberation,” they
brought the tactical repertoires, organizational templates, and collective action
frames they had acquired in those other movements with them. These included
adopting the concepts of “coming out” and “gay pride” as a way of creating visibility,
disrupting heteronormative cultural codes, and generating a new political identity;
zaps and other disruptive direct action tactics; and the creation of safe spaces for
political consciousness-raising. 17 The organizations, tactics, and collective action
frames that emerged in the aftermath of Stonewall would form the backbone of
lesbian and gay rights activism for decades to come. For these reasons, the Stonewall
riots are commonly considered to mark the beginning of the modern LGBTQ rights
movement. Transformative events, then, may generate dramatic shifts in
mobilization levels but are not defined solely in relationship to mobilization. They
may generate tactical innovations, alter political consciousness, foster organizational
changes, and more.
It is important to differentiate here between transformative events and, for
lack of a better term, ordinary events. Ordinary events are part of the life-blood of
social movements. Activists form organizations (i.e., the Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, the nation’s oldest and largest LGBTQ rights litigation
organization)18 or more loosely structured networks (i.e., Black Lives Matter)19. They
partake in protests, meetings, lobbying, petition drives, and lawsuits. Accumulations
of these ordinary events can have powerful effects over time. This work is
extraordinarily important and nothing in this Article is meant to minimize it.
Transformative events comprise, at best, a tiny fraction of all the events associated
with a social movement. Nonetheless, their role as catalysts for radical change in the
trajectories of social movements warrants our attention.
In this Article, I apply the concept of transformative events to a handful of
judicial decisions, like Obergefell, that have been described widely as turning points
16
17

18
19

JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES 238 (1983).
For extended discussions of Stonewall’s transformative effect on the LGBTQ rights movement see
generally MARGARET CRUIKSHANK, THE GAY AND LESBIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT (1992); MARC STEIN,
RETHINKING THE GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT (2012); Elizabeth A. Armstrong & Suzanna M. Crage,
Movements and Memory: The Making of the Stonewall Myth, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 724 (2006); Verta Taylor
& Nancy E. Whittier, Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian Feminist
Mobilization, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 104 (1992).
About Us: Who We Are, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/about-us (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
About the Black Lives Matter Network, BLACK LIVES MATTER, http://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ (last
visited May 16, 2017).
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and/or watersheds in the struggle for LGBTQ rights. I have multiple aims in doing
so. First, I wish to broaden our understanding of the types of events that can have
transformative capacities. Scholars have studied the transformative capacity of many
types of events, including natural disasters, instances of government-directed
violence, assassinations, military actions, government decrees, the emergence of new
organizations, and the adoption of new collective action tactics.20 They have not, as
yet, considered judicial decisions as a category of transformative event. I correct this
oversight. In so doing, I add to the growing body of scholarship examining the
relationship between judicial decisions and social movement progress. Much of this
literature has examined the wisdom and utility of using litigation to achieve social
change.21 My aim is somewhat different. I am not interested here in revisiting the
“wisdom” debate. Instead, I am interested in considering when and why court
decisions can trigger what McAdam and Sewell call “concentrated moments of
political and cultural creativity.”22
Second, I show that the transformative events framework generates seemingly
counterintuitive results that drive home the multifaceted effects of judicial decisions.
I apply the framework to four cases widely considered to be watersheds in the
progress of the LGBTQ rights movement. In chronological order they are: Baehr v.
Lewin,23 the 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court decision requiring Hawaii to demonstrate
a compelling interest in barring same-sex couples from marrying; Romer v. Evans,24
the 1996 Supreme Court decision striking down a state constitutional amendment
that repealed all existing gay rights laws and prevented the enactment of any such
future laws; Lawrence v. Texas,25 the 2003 Supreme Court decision striking down
state sodomy laws, and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 26 the 2003
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision requiring Massachusetts to open
marriage to same-sex couples. I show that Baehr and Goodridge both meet the
definition of a transformative event but that Romer and Lawrence do not. Stated
20

21

22
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26

See, e.g., Lorenzo Bosi, Social Movement Participation and the “Timing” of Involvement: The Case of the
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement, 27 RES. SOC. MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS & CHANGE 37 (2007);
Sean Chabot & Stellan Vinthagen, Rethinking Nonviolent Action and Contentious Politics: Political
Cultures of Nonviolent Opposition in the Indian Independence Movement and Brazil’s Landless Workers
Movement, 27 RES. SOC. MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS AND CHANGE 91 (2007); Hess & Martin, supra note 14;
Adam Moore, The Eventfulness of Social Reproduction, 29 SOC. THEORY 294 (2011); Karen Rasler,
Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution, AM. SOC. 132 (1996); Stefania
Vicari, The Interpretative Dimension of Transformative Events: Outrage Management and Collective
Action Framing After the 2001 Anti-G8 Summit in Genoa, 14 SOC. MOVEMENT STUD. 596 (2015 REV.).
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2012); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2008); Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial
Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 L. SOC. REV. 151 (2009).
McAdam & Sewell, supra note 12, at 102.
See 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993).
See 517 U.S. 620, 626–27 (1996).
See 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
See 798 N.E.2d 941, 959–61 (2003).
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differently, I show that Baehr and Goodridge were catalysts for transformative
change in the larger LGBTQ movement in a way that Romer and Lawrence were not.
This may strike some readers as odd, given that Lawrence marked the
successful culmination of a several decade long effort to eradicate sodomy laws and
that it also helped to lay the groundwork for the Supreme Court’s decision in
Obergefell. But it highlights the distinction between the direct and indirect effects of
judicial decisions. Lawrence undeniably foreclosed an argument that had long
stymied LGBTQ rights activists (namely that LGBTQ people were criminals by
synecdoche, because the conduct that defined the class could be criminalized). The
decision also, particularly via Justice Scalia’s dissent, strengthened the argument
that same-sex couples had a constitutional right to marry. In other words, Lawrence
had powerful direct effects. Lawrence did not, however, have the indirect catalytic
effect that Stonewall did. It did not prompt a radical shift in the level or nature of
mobilization nor did it generate tactical innovations, alter political consciousness,
foster organizational change, etc. For all of its undeniable importance, Lawrence was
an “ordinary” event, not a transformative one.27
My final aim is to provide a framework for assessing two recent Supreme Court
marriage equality decisions, Obergefell v. Hodges and United States v. Windsor.28
This assessment is necessarily preliminary because transformative events are by
their very nature interpretive. Stonewall did not “make” anything happen. It was
merely a catalyst for individuals to make a particular series of choices. In fact, there
were a number of LGBTQ-related riots in the years preceding Stonewall. 29 We
remember Stonewall now not because it was qualitatively different as a riot, but
because it was a spark that flared at the right moment: capturing the imagination of
potential activists who had the numbers, the resources, the space, and the vision to
capitalize on it. So what of Obergefell and Windsor? Can we see any evidence that
they might be catalysts for radical change in the trajectory of the LGBTQ movement?
Or are they “merely” important cases, like Romer and Lawrence?30
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I draw on social movement
scholarship to develop a list of criteria for determining whether or not a judicial
decision is appropriately characterized as transformative. I make a few a priori
assumptions at the outset. First, in order for a court decision to be classified as a
transformative event it must clearly and measurably alter the capacity of that
movement to effect social change. Second, the scope of this change must be both
dramatic and proximate in time to the event itself. Third, the change must be
enduring rather than transient. In Part III, I apply the concept of transformative
27
28
29
30

It’s worth noting again that ordinary events are the life-blood of social movements. That Lawrence is
not classified as a transformative event should not be read to imply that the decision had little effect on
the progress of the LGBTQ rights movement.
See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584; United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
Elizabeth A. Armstrong & Suzanna M. Crage, Movements and Memory: The Making of the Stonewall
Myth, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 724, 724–51 (2006).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 US 620 (1996).
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events to Baehr, Romer, Lawrence, and Goodridge. I take the lessons from Part III
and apply them to Windsor and Obergefell31 in Part IV.
I.

IDENTIFYING TRANSFORMATIVE EVENTS

How do we know a transformative event has occurred? What criteria do we use
to identify it? Social movement scholars examine activism at three different levels:
the individual, the group, and the structural.32 In this Part, I argue that significant,
sudden, and enduring changes at any of these three levels may indicate the presence
of a transformative event. I discuss each level in turn.
As a prelude to that discussion, I want to make the nature of my argument
clear. I am not claiming that any particular change is either necessary or sufficient
to mark the presence of a transformative event. Indeed, I have no fixed sense of how
many changes are necessary in order to classify a judicial decision as transformative.
In part, that is because the transformational nature of an event is, of necessity, an
interpretive matter. 33 The changes that made the Montgomery Bus Boycott a
transformative event in the civil rights movement share similarities and differences
with the changes that made Stonewall a transformative event in the LGBTQ rights
movement. To demand the presence of a specific benchmark, would be, I believe,
inapposite. Instead, I proceed from the admittedly squishy perspective that events
which result in wider and more dramatic changes fall more obviously into the class
of transformative events.
A. Individual-Level Changes
Scholars exploring social movements at the individual level have primarily
interested themselves in the factors that affect an individual’s willingness to be active
in a movement. The very concept of transformative events was first identified in the
context of radical shifts in levels of mobilization over the course of the civil rights
movement in the United States.34 Is the concept of transformative events inextricably
bound to changes in mobilization levels? I think not. Dramatic shifts in levels of
mobilization around a particular cause are one way to identify a turning point in the
history of a social movement, but we can certainly imagine a circumstance under
which a movement’s claims might become suddenly more—or less—successful
without a corresponding shift in individual protest activity. Nonetheless, dramatic
increases or decreases in mobilization offer us one way to determine whether
Obergefell or any other court decision is properly treated as a transformative event
in the history of the LGBTQ rights movement.

31
32
33
34

See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675.
See e.g., THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (David A. Snow, Sarah Anne Soule, &
Hanspeter Kriesi eds., 2004).
See generally Vicari, supra note 20 (containing and extended discussion of the interpretive nature of
transformative events).
See Morris, supra note 14 at 452. Contra McAdam & Sewell, supra note 12 at 107.
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B. Group-Level Changes
Social movement organizations (SMOs) are crucial elements of social
movements. They are, in many ways, the building blocks of movements and scholars
have devoted considerable attention to them. SMOs have many functions. They work
to mobilize potential adherents and amass resources. They serve as points of
communication within and across movements. They develop and deploy strategies
and tactics. Both the Montgomery Bus Boycott and Stonewall are considered
transformative events in part because of their group-level effects: among other things,
they generated new tactics and propelled new leaders to the forefront of their
movements.
Large-scale changes at the group level may also help to determine whether
Obergefell and other court decisions are transformative events in the LGBTQ
movement. Did a judicial decision spark SMOs within the LGBTQ rights movement
to dramatically change their strategies and tactics for enacting social change? Did it
enable groups to leverage significant additional resources (such as money) or, in the
alternative, dramatically reduce the availability of resources to those groups? Was it
a catalyst for the emergence of new organizations or, alternatively, the collapse of
existing groups? Did it substantially change how existing organizations interacted
with each other? Did it do any of these things in a way that measurably altered the
capacity of the LGBTQ rights movement to effect social change? If so, that judicial
decision might well be considered a transformative event in the history of the LGBTQ
rights movement, even in the absence of dramatic changes in the level of mass
mobilization.
C. Structural-Level Changes
Social movements do not act in isolation. They operate within specific social
contexts. “Political opportunity structure” refers broadly to the institutional and
socio-cultural factors that shape social movement options by making some strategies
more appealing and/or feasible than others.35 The core idea here is that changes in
the structure of political opportunities may open or close spaces for political action.
Scholars vary somewhat in their articulations of the dimensions of political
opportunity structure. However, substantial agreement exists on three dimensions.
The first is access to the formal institutional structure of policy making: courts,
legislatures, the executive branch, and the bureaucracy, both at the state and federal
levels. Consider the mechanics of the judicial process shape access in a number of
ways, including what issues may be litigated, who may litigate, and where such
35

See generally DOUG MCADAM, JOHN D. MCCARTHY & MAYER N. ZALD, COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS
(1996); SIDNEY G. TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS (2011);
Hanspeter Kriesi, Political Context and Opportunity, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 67 (2004).
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litigation may occur. Access to the legislature is shaped by a different set of factors,
prominent among them the extent to which the party currently in control is
sympathetic to a social movement’s aims. A large body of scholarly work shows that
access (or the lack thereof) to formal structures of government shapes the path of
social movements.36 I suggest here that one indicator that a judicial decision should
be considered a transformative event is whether it radically and consequentially
alters the capacity of a social movement to access one or more of the formal
institutional structures of policy making.
The second dimension of political opportunity structure upon which there is
general agreement is the configuration of allies and adversaries. Potential allies of a
social movement include political parties, interest groups, other social movements,
and domain experts (people with claims to expertise in a particular area), as well as
policy makers and other types of public authorities. By generating political openness
on their issues of concern, social movements almost always generate their own
opposition.37 A movement’s potential adversaries include the same types of groups
that form that movement’s potential allies (parties, policy makers, and the like). The
presence of allies and adversaries has been shown to significantly affect the progress
and outcomes of social movements.38 Because of this presence, a judicial decision that
affects the alliance and adversary systems surrounding a social movement in a
dramatic and enduring fashion might well be a transformative one.
The third broadly accepted dimension of political opportunity structure is the
configuration of elites with respect to relevant issues/challengers. Elites, here,
generally refers to actors who are in a position to exert some control over a particular
policy domain. Importantly, policy domains are usually governed by multiple elites
who may or may not agree with each other. When elites are united in opposition to a
particular social movement claim, social movements generally have little chance of
effecting change. But when elite configurations begin to shift—when fissures emerge
between elites or when elites as a whole become more open to a movement claim—

36

37
38

For example, Charles Brockett showed that the fortunes of peasant movements in Nicaragua and
Honduras were influenced by their varying ability to gain access to the formal mechanisms of
government. Charles Brockett, The Structure of Political Opportunities and Peasant Mobilization in
Central America, 23 COMP. POL. 253, 261 (1991). See also Herbert Kitschelt, Political Opportunity
Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies, 16 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 57,
58 (1986); Hanspeter Kriesi, The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements: Its Impact
on Their Mobilization, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL PROTEST: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON STATES AND
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 167 (1995).
David S. Meyer & Suzanne Staggenborg, Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political
Opportunity, AM. J. SOC. 1628, 1635 (1996).
Craig Jenkins and Charles Perrow, for example, found that the farm worker movement in the 1960s
was more successful than its 1940s counterpart largely because of the existence of urban liberal allies
in the latter period. Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1946-1972), AM. SOC. REV.
249, 263 (1977). Similarly, William Gamson found that differential success rates on the part of fiftythree challenging groups were closely related to the availability of allies willing and able to support
their claims. WILLIAM GAMSON, THE STRATEGY OF POLITICAL PROTEST (1975).
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the ability of social movements to secure their goals increases.39 A judicial decision
that significantly alters elite alignments with respect to a social movement claim,
then, might well be classified as a transformative event.
In addition to these three dimensions of political opportunity structure, social
movement scholars generally agree that existing cultural frames shape the capacity
of social movements to make persuasive arguments. A frame is an interpretive
schematic that allows us “to locate, perceive, identify and label” aspects of an event
in ways that make them meaningful.40 Social movements seeking to effect change
must “sell” (frame) their arguments about injustice in a way that makes sense to
potential “buyers” (elites, allies, the media, the general public). They are constrained
in doing so by the cultural frames that are available. For example, shortly after the
Stonewall riots, a handful of same-sex couples filed lawsuits arguing that they had a
right to marry.41 These cases were all laughed out of court. In the words of one judge,
“In substance, the relationship proposed by the appellants does not authorize the
issuance of a marriage license because what they propose is not a marriage.”42 For
these judges, the set of meanings (frames) surrounding homosexuality existed in
opposition to the set of meanings surrounding marriage.
The decades-long task facing marriage equality activists was to align the
frames surrounding marriage and homosexuality so that they existed in congruence
with each other rather than in opposition.43 Stated differently, the story told by samesex couples seeking to marry in the 1970s simply made no sense given dominant
cultural understandings of the meanings of both homosexuality and marriage. The
laborious task of marriage equality activists, then, was to encourage elites, allies, and
the general public to reframe their understandings of both homosexuality and
marriage so that the two concepts nested together comfortably.
Social movement scholars have shown that critical events can dramatically
alter the availability or salience of particular frames in ways that affect the capacity
of social movements to make persuasive claims. The terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, for example, dramatically altered public perceptions of the threat posed by
Muslims. 44 Among many other consequences, the 9/11 attacks increased the
persuasiveness of the “Islam as anti-American” frame. Similarly, the emergence of
the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the United States likewise altered public perceptions of
39
40
41
42
43
44

But see Douglas NeJaime’s, Convincing Elites, Controlling Elites, in SPECIAL ISSUE SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS/LEGAL POSSIBILITIES 175 (2011) (arguing that elite support can sometimes inadvertently
generate political and legal risks that can impede the ability of social movements to achieve their aims).
ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS 21 (1974).
See e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191
N.W.2d 185 (1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App. 1974).
Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 590.
See generally Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An
Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 611 (2000) (about frames and frame alignment processes).
See generally, e.g., Gregory M. Maney, Patrick G. Coy & Lynne M. Woehrle, Pursuing Political
Persuasion: War and Peace Frames in the United States after September 11th, 8 SOC. MOVEMENT STUD.
299 (2009).

2017]

Transformative Events in the LGBTQ Rights Movement

450

the threat posed by gay men, increasing the salience of the “homosexuality as disease”
frame in ways that advantaged opponents and disadvantaged proponents of gay
rights.45 The recent spate of documented African-American deaths at the hands of
police officers has opened up a new space for conversation about institutionalized
racism in the United States; civil rights activists are currently trying to leverage this
new openness as they press for the dismantling of racist structures and attitudes. To
the extent that judicial decisions produce dramatic alterations in the availability or
persuasiveness of cultural frames, they might reasonably be classified as
transformative events.
I have argued elsewhere that legal frames exist alongside cultural frames and
that movements seeking to effect social change through litigation are constrained by
both types of frames.46 By legal frames, I mean the categories previously established
by an amalgam of constitutional, statutory, administrative, common, and case law.
Legal and cultural frames are mutually constitutive: cultural symbols and discourses
shape legal understandings just as legal discourses and symbols shape cultural
understandings.47 But is a dramatic and enduring change in legal frames generated
by a judicial decision enough, by itself, to classify that decision as a transformative
event in the history of a social movement? I tend to think that the answer is no.
Landmark legal decisions, such as Brown v. Board of Education, 48 Griswold v.
Connecticut,49 and the like, are not ipso facto transformative events, even though they
may ultimately play crucial roles in advancing the goals of social movements.
Transformative events are, by definition, catalysts for radical change in the
trajectories of social movements. For a landmark decision to qualify as a
transformative event we should expect to see changes in a movement’s trajectory that
are dramatic, enduring, and proximate in time to the decision itself.
To recap: Transformative events comprise a tiny subgroup of the universe of
events that mark, shape, and sustain social movements. They differ from other
“ordinary” events because they catalyze radical change in the trajectory of a social
movement, change that clearly and measurably alters the capacity of that movement
to advance its aims. Transformative events can only be recognized after the fact: they
are identified not by their capacity to produce change but by actual change itself. This
change can take many differ forms. The classic marker of a transformative event is a
dramatic shift in mobilization. I have described several other markers, including
changes in a movement’s strategies and tactics, changes in its organizational forms
and capacities, changes in its ability to access the institutions of government, changes
in the configuration of elites, allies, and adversaries surrounding the movement, and
45
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See Josh Gamson, Silence, Death, and the Invisible Enemy: AIDS Activism and Social Movement
“Newness,” 36 SOC. PROBS. 351, 359 (1989); Robert Padgug, Gay Villain, Gay Hero: Homosexuality and
the Social Construction of AIDS, in PASSION AND POWER: SEXUALITY IN HISTORY 293, 295–96 (1989).
ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS AND INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND
GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION (2006).
This is precisely why movements throughout American history have invoked legal norms and practices
in their efforts to promote social change and conversely why shifting social norms have often been
followed by shifting interpretations of what the law requires.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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changes in the availability and salience of cultural frames. I have no requirement
that a particular change must occur. Instead, I proceed from the assumption that
events that inspire wider and more dramatic changes fall more obviously into the
class of transformative events.
II.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS AS TRANSFORMATIVE EVENTS

Scholars, journalists, and movement activists have been strikingly quick to
argue that judicial decisions have played transformational roles in the struggle for
LGBTQ rights, particularly in the context of marriage equality. In this Part, I apply
the transformative events framework to four of the cases most widely depicted as
watersheds: two Supreme Court cases, Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas, and
two cases decided in state courts of last resort, Baehr v. Lewin and Goodridge v. Dept.
of Public Health.
Baehr and Romer were litigated at roughly the same time during the 1990s.
Lawrence and Goodridge similarly overlapped in the 2000s. Because of this overlap,
I pair these cases in the following analysis. I show that all four cases were important
to the progress of the LGBTQ rights movement but that only two had transformative
qualities.
A. Baehr v. Lewin
In 1991, three same-sex couples filed a lawsuit in Hawaii arguing that they
had a fundamental right to marry each other under the state’s constitution. Baehr v.
Lewin was dismissed by the trial court. On appeal, however, the Hawaii Supreme
Court made history by becoming the first court in the nation to treat seriously the
claim that same-sex couples had a constitutional interest in marrying each other. 50
The court ruled that the state’s refusal to marry same-sex couples constituted sex
discrimination and thus was subject to strict scrutiny under the constitution’s equal
rights amendment. The court reinstated the case and remanded it for a trial to
determine if the state’s rationale for limiting marriage to different-sex couples
constituted a compelling state interest.
This decision—sometimes lumped together with the 1996 trial court holding in
Baehr v. Miike 51 that Hawaii had failed to show even a rational basis for its
exclusionary policy—is widely viewed as a watershed in the movement for LGBTQ
rights.52 And indeed, Baehr v. Lewin radically altered the terms of the debate around
50
51
52

Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (1993).
Baehr v. Miike, 80 Haw. 341, 910 P.2d 112 (1996).
Evan Wolfson, who then worked for the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and was active in
the case, wrote that Baehr was “nothing less than a tectonic shift, a fundamental realignment of the
landscape, possibly the biggest lesbian and gay rights legal victory ever.” Evan Wolfson, Crossing the
Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21
N.Y.U. REV. L. SOC. CHANGE 567, 572 (1993). While we might expect a litigator actively involved in a
case to trumpet its significance, an array of scholars, journalists, and litigators uninvolved with the
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LGBTQ rights. It inspired mobilization by both supporters and opponents of marriage
equality. It forced LGBTQ rights groups to reorder their priorities and sparked the
creation of new activist nodes within the movement. And it served as a catalyst for
government repression, through the passage of laws specifically designed to stymie
the progress of the LGBTQ rights movement. Let me unpack these conclusions.
In the words of William Rubenstein, Baehr made “the previously unthinkable
suddenly real.” 53 Prior to the decision, there had been severe intra-community
tension over the value of pursuing marriage as a goal. As a result of this tension, none
of the major LGBTQ rights litigation organizations had treated marriage as a
priority. Baehr completely changed the calculus because it was a legal victory that
needed to be defended. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund became cocounsel in Baehr after the 1993 decision. Lambda also established the Marriage
Project, an umbrella organization within which LGBTQ rights activists could
facilitate state-by-state political organization and public education about same-sex
marriage, coordinate possible future legal challenges, and seek allies.54 Baehr thus
widened the scope of conflict around LGBTQ rights to include marriage equality,
shifted the priorities of the major movement organizations, and sparked the creation
of a new mechanism for intra-group cooperation.
The Marriage Project’s emphasis on political mobilization reflected a
recognition that the Baehr decision was both promising and dangerous for the
LGBTQ rights movement. The Full Faith and Credit clause of the US Constitution
generally requires that states recognize official acts and proceeding of other states.55
However, states are exempted from recognizing marriages when doing so violates the
“strong public policy” of the state.56 The Marriage Project recognized that opponents
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case, also describe Baehr as a watershed victory. Compare e.g., Edward Stein, Marriage or Liberation?:
Reflections on Two Strategies in the Struggle for Lesbian and Gay Rights and Relationship Recognition,
61 RUTGERS L. REV. 567, 574 (2009); Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Sylvia Ann Law, Baehr v. Lewin and
the Long Road to Marriage Equality, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 705, 712 (2011); and Bennett Klein & Daniel
Redman, From Separate to Equal: Litigating Marriage Equality in a Civil Union State, 41 CONN. REV.
1381, 1389 (2008). Others, however, have argued that Baehr was a watershed in terms of the
significant damage it did to the LGBTQ rights movement. Baehr, the argument goes, inspired such a
large backlash by forces opposed to marriage equality that it harmed the cause of marriage equality
specifically and LGBT rights more generally far more than it helped. See ROSENBERG, supra note 21 at
343–44.
William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599, 618 (1999).
As part of the Marriage Project, Wolfson worked with Professor Barbara Cox at California Western
School of Law to generate an analysis of the laws in each state in order to determine where activists
were more likely to win marriage equality—and defend it against political backlash. The process of
seeking experts in each state to draft an analysis had, as a secondary effect, the establishment of a
fifty-state network of marriage equality activists. Personal Interview with Beth Robinson, Attorney,
Lambda Legal (March 30, 2015) (on file with the author). See also Scott L. Cummings & Douglas
NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1254 (2010).
Article IV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1988 AM. L. INST. 1971).
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of marriage equality would try to carve “strong public policy” objections into laws
across the nation.
They were right. Conservative groups such as the Family Research Council,
Focus on the Family, and the Christian Coalition, and religious organizations such
as the Mormon, Catholic, and many evangelical churches quickly came together to
oppose marriage equality. In fact, opposition to marriage equality joined opposition
to abortion rights as the two major public priorities of many conservative groups
during the 1990s.57 Opposition groups used Baehr as a focal point to lobby federal
and state legislators to oppose marriage equality. 58 These lobbying efforts were
extremely successful. By the time the trial court issued its decision in Baehr late in
1996, sixteen states had passed bills doing one or more of the following: explicitly
defining marriage as a union between one man and one woman, prohibiting marriage
between members of the same sex, and prohibiting recognition of same-sex marriages
performed in other jurisdictions.59 By 1998, the number of states with such laws had
risen to thirty.60
Most strikingly, shortly before the trial on Baehr was to begin Congress
passed—and President Clinton signed—the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which
(a) exempted states from the requirements of the full faith and credit clause insofar
as it pertained to recognizing same-sex marriages performed in other states and (b)
defined the words “marriage” and “spouse” to encompass only heterosexual couplings
for all federal purposes.61 The House of Representatives Report’s conclusion stated
that it was “both appropriate and necessary for Congress to do what it can to defend
the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage. . . . The effort to redefine
‘marriage’ to extend to homosexual couples is a truly radical proposal that would
fundamentally alter the institution of marriage.”62
Baehr thus served as a catalyst both for mobilization by adversaries and for
government repression. Ironically, conservative mobilization around Baehr elevated
the importance of relationship recognition to LGBTQ activists across the nation and
resulted in a spate of grassroots organizing around the nation. Dozens of groups
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TINA FETNER, HOW THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT SHAPED LESBIAN AND GAY ACTIVISM (2008). Michael Dorf and
Sidney Tarrow refer to this as the rise of an anticipatory countermovement. Michael C. Dorf & Sidney
Tarrow, Strange Bedfellows: How an Anticipatory Countermovement Brought Same-sex Marriage into
the Public Arena, 39 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 449, 450 (2014).
David W. Dunlap, Fearing a Toehold for Gay Marriages, Conservatives Rush to Bar the Door, N.Y.
TIMES, March 6, 1996, at A13; Adam Nagourney, Christian Coalition Pushes for Showdown on SameSex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1996.
SEAN CAHILL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: FOCUS ON THE FACTS 9 (2004). Utah passed
legislation in 1995. Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee passed
legislation in 1996.
Id. Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, and Virginia
passed laws in 1997. Alabama, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, and Washington passed laws in 1998.
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 2(a), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1998).
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (internal citations omitted).
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emerged around the nation to fight for marriage equality.63 LGBTQ activists in those
states scrambled to stave off marriage bans, but they consistently lost the battle to
frame the issue in a way that resonated with legislators. In the 1990s, marriage
equality was an issue pushed by its opponents far more urgently than by its
proponents.64
While I have centered my analysis on events happening outside Hawaii, it is
important to recognize that Baehr was a catalyst for events within the state as well.
After the 1996 trial ruling, the state’s legislature passed two bills. The first, called
the “Reciprocal Beneficiaries” Act, gave dozens of legal and economic protections to
couples, both homosexual or heterosexual, who were ineligible to marry.65 The second
bill authorized the people of Hawaii to vote on a constitutional amendment that would
grant the legislature the power to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples.66 The
proposed amendment was placed on the 1998 ballot.67 Proponents and opponents of
same-sex marriage engaged in massive campaigns to sway the vote on the upcoming
ballot measure; roughly $1.5 million was spent by each side during the campaign.68As
on the mainland, opposition to marriage equality won the day: voters approved the
measure by a margin of more than two-to-one. 69 The Hawaii Supreme Court
subsequently dismissed Baehr, ruling that the amendment had taken the marriage
statute “out of the ambit of the equal protection clause of the Hawaii Constitution.”70
In sum, the 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court decision and subsequent trial in
Baehr v. Lewin profoundly, dramatically, and measurably changed the direction of
the LGBTQ rights movement and altered its capacity to effect social change. It forced
LGBTQ groups to reorder their priorities. It prompted organizational expansion and
a new mechanism for existing groups to communicate with each other. It mobilized
LGBTQ activists and their allies to fight against proposed legislation in thirty states
across the nation and against a ballot initiative in Hawaii. It also signaled a possible
63
64
65
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FETNER, supra note 57 at 112. Marriage Equality USA, for example, originated as a direct response to
the Defense of Marriage Act. See Our History, MARRIAGE EQUALITY USA,
http://www.marriageequality.org/our_history (last visited Aug. 6, 2016).
See FETNER, supra note 57 at 94–96; Dorf & Tarrow, supra note 57 at 463.
Act 383, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 2786. The law offered about 60 state-level benefits to registered
beneficiaries, including hospital visitation, family leave, health coverage, and inheritance. It fell far
short, however, of the 160 or so state-level benefits offered by legal marriage in Hawaii. Civil Unions,
PARTNERS TASK FORCE FOR GAY AND LESBIAN COUPLES (Mar. 6, 2011)
http://www.buddybuddy.com/dphawa.html.
H.B. 117, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 2883.
Hawaii 1998 Ballot Measures, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Hawaii_1998_ballot_measures (last
visited Apr. 22, 2017).
The Mormon church was the largest donor to the pro-amendment side. The Human Rights Campaign
was the largest donor to the anti-amendment forces. For an in-depth discussion of Baehr’s effects
within Hawaii, see generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE
OF GAY RIGHTS 15–25 (2002)); Kathleen E. Hull, The Political Limits of the Rights Frame: The Case of
Same-Sex Marriage in Hawaii, 44 SOC. PERSP. 207, 214 (2001).
Hawaii Legislative Power to Reserve Marriage, Question 2, BallotPedia,
https://ballotpedia.org/Hawaii_Legislative_Power_to_Reserve_Marriage,_Question_2_(1998) (last
visited Apr. 22, 2017).
Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *6 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999).
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fracturing of elite alignments among the judiciary. Recall that earlier attempts by
same-sex couples to claim a constitutional right to marry had been laughed out of
court. The 1993 and 1996 decisions in Baehr suggested that judges had become more
receptive to relationship-based claims.
If Baehr signaled a possible fracturing of elite alignments among the judiciary,
it showed no similar fracturing among legislative elites. The passage of the federal
DOMA and thirty statewide mini-DOMAs within five years of the 1993 decision in
Baehr did little direct harm to same-sex couples (after all, they could not marry
anyway). But indirectly they signaled both the repressive power of the state and the
emergence of a powerful countermovement intent on preventing the extension of
marriage to same-sex couples.
B. Romer v. Evans
The entirety of Romer v. Evans took place during the litigation of Baehr. At
stake in Romer was the constitutionality of Colorado’s Amendment 2. The initiative,
passed in 1992 after a bitter campaign, repealed all existing state and local provisions
protecting lesbian, bisexual, and gay men from discrimination. It also prohibited the
enactment of any future such provisions.71 Nine days after voters passed Amendment
2, an assortment of legal groups, including Lambda Legal, the ACLU, and the newlyformed Colorado Legal Initiatives Project filed suit asking Colorado’s district court to
enjoin Amendment 2 from taking effect.
Romer took three years to work its way up to the US Supreme Court. The Court
heard oral arguments on October 10, 1995, and issued an opinion on May 6, 1996.
Romer thus came to the Supreme Court well after the Hawaii Supreme Court’s 1993
ruling in Baehr but before the September 1996 trial in the case.72 By a 6-3 majority,
the Court struck down Amendment 2, ruling that was “born of animosity” toward
lesbians and gay men. “A bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” Justice
Kennedy wrote, “cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”73
Romer, like Baehr, has been widely viewed as a watershed in the movement
for LGBTQ rights.74 There are a number of reasons for this assessment. First, Romer
71
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At the time of Amendment 2’s passage, Aspen, Boulder, and Denver had gay rights ordinances
protecting “individuals from job, housing, and public accommodations discrimination when that
discrimination is based solely on sexual orientation.” The Williams Ins., Chapter 13: Voters’ Initiatives
to Repeal or Prevent Laws Prohibiting Employment Discrimination Against LGBT People, 1974-Present,
5 (last visited Apr. 2, 2017), http://docplayer.net/29210418-Chapter-13-voters-initiatives-to-repeal-orprevent-laws-prohibiting-employment-discrimination-against-lgbt-people-1974-present.html.
The federal DOMA was also passed in September 1996. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. §1738C
(1996).
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
As with Baehr, activists and journalists were quick to read Romer as re-writing the legal landscape of
LGBT rights. See LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL
235 (1998). But a number of academics also read Romer as transformational. See Louis Michael
Seidman, Romer’s Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 SUP. CT. REV.
67, 67 (1996); Linda C. McClain, From Romer v. Evans to United States v. Windsor: Law as a Vehicle

2017]

Transformative Events in the LGBTQ Rights Movement

456

was the first unambiguously pro-LGBTQ ruling to emerge from the Supreme Court.
While Bowers v. Hardwick,75 decided a mere nine years earlier, had drawn on moral
disapproval of homosexuality to support its holding that the right of privacy did not
extend to same-sex sex, the Romer majority recognized the animus toward LGBTQ
people underlying Amendment 2 and explicitly repudiated it, suggesting that the
Court had evolved in terms of its understanding of the sociolegal implications of
homosexuality.
Second, Romer offered a roadmap of sorts to reverse Hardwick, courtesy of
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion. Justice Scalia had argued that if it was
permissible for a state to make “homosexual conduct” a crime, then logically it was
also permissible for a state to decline to bestow what he referred to as “special
protections upon homosexual conduct.”76 But this logic chain was reversible. If, under
Romer, Colorado’s Amendment 2 could not pass constitutional muster, then surely
sodomy laws were unconstitutional as well.
Third, Romer positioned lesbians and gay men as a group worthy of protection
under the Equal Protection Clause, opening the possibility that other types of
discriminatory laws might fall to equal protection challenges. As Louis Michael
Seidman wrote at the time, Romer “gives litigants new ammunition to challenge a
range of practices previously thought permissible, including the exclusion of gay
people from a variety of antidiscrimination and social welfare measures, the
military’s “don’t ask/don’t tell” policy, and the prohibition on gay marriage.”77
Described from a social movement perspective, then, Romer suggested that
elite alignments among the judiciary were becoming more favorable to LGBTQ
claims.78 It offered a powerful new legal argument to LGBTQ rights advocates (that
laws passed based on animus toward LGBTQ people were unconstitutional) and
undercut the rationale for criminalizing same-sex sex. Yet despite these clear and
important additions to the arsenal of LGBTQ rights activists, there is little evidence
that Romer prompted a dramatic shift in mobilization or a dramatic, proximate, and
measurable shift in most of the other markers of transformative events.
One obvious place to look is at changes in the organizational forms, capacities,
or tactics of major LGBTQ organizations. Romer certainly increased the confidence of
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for Moral Disapproval in Amendment 2 and the Defense of Marriage Act, 20 DUKE J. GEND. L. & POL’Y
351, 411 (2013).
478 U.S. 186 (1985).
“If it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is
constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct. . . .
And a fortiori it is constitutionally permissible for a State to adopt a provision not even disfavoring
homosexual conduct, but merely prohibiting all levels of state government from bestowing special
protections upon homosexual conduct.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 641 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
Seidman, supra note 74 at 68.
It is worth noting here four Colorado courts had taken a dim view of Amendment 2’s constitutionality
during the cases assent to the U.S. Supreme Court. Amendment 2 went to trial twice, once to
determine whether it would be enjoined before it took effect (yes) and once to determine whether it
served a compelling governmental interest (no). In each instance, the State appealed the unfavorable
outcome to Colorado’s Supreme Court. Both times, the state high court upheld the lower court decision.
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LGBTQ advocacy groups that they could finally eradicate sodomy laws across the
nation and they began searching for an appropriate test case.79 But the case did not
shift their priorities in the way that Baehr had. An intergroup coalition designed to
eradicate sodomy laws had been formed years earlier (the Ad-Hoc Task Force to
Eliminate Sodomy Laws, which eventually morphed into the Litigator’s
Roundtable). 80 Advocacy groups were already seeking to dismantle sodomy laws,
using a state-by-state strategy. Romer opened up the possibility of a federal
constitutional claim, but it did not change the biggest problem bedeviling advocacy
groups: finding suitable plaintiffs who had actually been arrested for violating
sodomy statutes. That continued to be a problem in Romer’s aftermath. Nor did
Romer cause any obvious change in the organizational forms, capacities, or tactics
with respect to other issues. Advocates added Romer to their arguments, but there is
no evidence that they fundamentally changed those arguments as a response to the
decision, or that they reordered their priorities as a response to the decision. For all
its undeniable value then, Romer did not generate changes in organizational forms
or capacities, nor did it fundamentally alter the tactics of advocacy groups.
Another obvious place to look for transformative change is in mobilization by
allies and adversaries around anti-gay ballot measures themselves. LGBTQ people
have had their civil rights put to a popular vote more than any other group of
citizens.81 Amendment 2 was not the only anti-gay measure on the ballot in 1992. A
similar measure in Oregon failed, while anti-gay opponents had tried and failed to
place a measure on the ballot in Arizona.82 The passage of Amendment 2 prompted a
slew of attempts by anti-gay activists to use electoral strategies to roll back gay rights
laws and/or prevent the passage of future such laws. Anti-gay activists succeeded in
putting measures on the ballot in twenty localities in 1993.83 They all passed. By
1994, there were active efforts to put statewide measures on the ballot in ten states,
although only measures in Idaho and Oregon actually made it to the ballot, where
both failed. Local measures were more successful. Citizens in Alachua County,
Florida, Austin, Texas, and Springfield, Missouri repealed local antidiscrimination
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It was, in the words of one gay rights advocate, a “huge new tool” for attacking state sodomy laws on
the federal level. ANDERSEN, supra note 46 at 124; MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME
COURT: ITS ROLE IN THE COURT’S HISTORY AND THE NATION’S CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 377 (2015).
ANDERSEN, supra note 46 at 85.
As Barbara Gamble has shown, nearly sixty percent of the initiatives and popular referenda that
appeared on state-wide ballots in the years between 1959 and 1993 focused on the civil rights of
LGBTQ people. Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POLIT. SCI. 245,
257 (1997).
The Oregon measure was known popularly as Measure 9. For in-depth discussions Measure 9 and other
anti-gay ballot measures, ANDERSEN, supra note 46 at 143–44; Gamble, supra note 81 at 258–59; see
STEPHANIE WITT & SUZANNE MCCORKLE, ANTI-GAY RIGHTS: ASSESSING VOTER INITIATIVES 18–20 (1997).
Sixteen of those localities were in Oregon, which had a particularly well-organized adversary group: the
Oregon Citizen’s Alliance. A court blocked an attempt to place a measure on the ballot in Anchorage
that year. See Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage, 860 P.2d 1214, 1221 (Alaska 1993).
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ordinances, and citizens in ten of eleven Oregon localities passed measures designed
to prevent the passage of any future gay rights measures.84
Did Romer shut down the use of popular initiatives and referenda to directly
attack the rights of LGBTQ people? That would certainly constitute a major change
in the capacity of the LGBTQ movement to achieve its aims. However, there is
surprisingly little evidence that Romer made a significant difference. By 1995, efforts
to use the ballot to repeal anti-discrimination laws and/or bar their passage were
already waning. Maine had an initiative on the ballot that failed; voters in West Palm
Beach, Florida refused to repeal a local gay rights ordinance.85 The year 1996 saw
only one repeal measure on the ballot—in Lansing, Michigan, where voters
overturned a recently enacted gay rights measure.86 Resort to the ballot as a tactic
for stymying anti-discrimination provisions was thus waning even before Romer was
decided. Moreover, adversaries have continued to resort to ballot measure to repeal
gay rights laws since Romer, particularly in locations like Oregon and Maine with
relatively strong adversary networks.87
Romer, then, seems to have had little direct influence on the tactics of antigay
adversaries. Why not? The evidence suggests that adversary groups had already
shifted the bulk of their attention from broad attacks against antidiscrimination laws
to focused attacks on marriage equality. By the time Romer was decided, opposition
groups were heavily lobbying state and federal legislatures to enact laws barring
same-sex marriage. Recall that sixteen states passed mini-DOMAs in 1995 and 1996,
in addition to the federal passage of DOMA in September 1996. 88 In short, the
“concentrated moment[] of political and cultural creativity” sparked by Baehr had
already transformed the adversary network surrounding LGBTQ rights. 89 Had
Romer upheld Amendment 2, events might have played out quite differently. But, as
it stands, Romer played an important role in changing the legal framework
surrounding LGBTQ rights, but it did not spark a transformation in the larger
LGBTQ rights movement—or its countermovement.
C. Lawrence v. Texas
John Lawrence and Tyrone Garner were arrested on September 17, 1998, for
having sex in Lawrence’s apartment in violation of Texas’s “Homosexual Conduct”
law, which prohibited “deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same
sex.”90 With Lambda Legal serving as their counsel, the men pleaded no contest to
84
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Citizens of Alachua County, Florida also passed a measure barring the future enactment of laws
preventing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
AMY L. STONE, GAY RIGHTS AT THE BALLOT BOX 30–31 (2012).
Id.
See Todd Donovan, Jim Wenzel, & Shaun Bowler, Direct Democracy and Gay Rights Initiatives After
Romer, in THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS 161–90 (2000); STONE, supra note 85 at 30–31.
STONE, supra note 85 at 30–31.
McAdam & Sewell, supra note 12, at 102.
TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.06 (1973).
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the charge and challenged the law, arguing among other things that it violated their
right to privacy under the federal constitution.91 Nearly five years later, on June 26,
2003, the US Supreme Court agreed. The government, according to the Court, had no
business policing the intimate personal relationships of consenting adults: “The
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean
their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime.”92
Lawrence is all-but-universally described by legal scholars, journalists, and
LGBTQ activists as a watershed moment in the movement for LGBTQ rights. In the
words of Mark Spindelman, “Lawrence has variously been praised as an unmitigated
victory for lesbian and gay rights, a turning point in our community’s history, and
the moment when we have gone from second-class political outcasts to constitutional
persons with first-class rights.”93
Lawrence is undeniably an important moment in the history of the American
LGBTQ rights movement. It marked the final victory in a decades-long battle to
decriminalize consensual same-sex relations, thereby cutting the legs out from under
a pervasive argument for denying rights to LGBTQ people: their supposed
criminality. It undercut the status-conduct distinction that had bedeviled much
LGBTQ rights litigation. It made arguments for increased scrutiny of classifications
based on sexual orientation more plausible, thereby providing a new mechanism for
accessing the judicial branch. As Romer did, Lawrence indicated that the Court was
evolving in terms of its understanding of the sociolegal implications of homosexuality.
And, just as Justice Scalia’s dissent in Romer provided a roadmap of sorts to
invalidating sodomy laws, his dissent in Lawrence provided a roadmap for
dismantling laws restricting marriage to different-sex couples. Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion had taken pains to distinguish the issue of marriage equality from
case at hand, noting that Lawrence did not “involve whether the government must
give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”94
Scalia was having none of it. Marriage equality, Scalia argued, was the inevitable
result of Lawrence’s logic: “What justification could there possibly be for denying the
benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising ‘[t]he liberty protected by the
Constitution’ [as defined by the majority in Lawrence]?”95
But did Lawrence have a catalytic effect on the LGBTQ movement? Did it spark
mobilization (or demobilization)? Did it spark a profound shift in the cultural frames
91
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Brief for Petitioner at 10, Scott v. Harris, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-1631), 2003 WL 152352.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1615–16 (2004). See also Jill
D. Weinberg, Remaking Lawrence, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 61, 69–70 (2012) (describing Lawrence as “a
case beyond law, representing a catalyst for sexual equality . . . the decision has little to do with actual
doctrine, but instead is a case that is imbued with symbolic meaning and potential for claimsmaking.”).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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surrounding either homosexuality or marriage equality? Did it affect the movement—
or its countermovement—at an organizational level? The data are mixed.
Evidence of change comes from Gallup’s longitudinal surveys of public opinion,
which show that public support for decriminalizing gay sex decreased in the
immediate aftermath of Lawrence, dropping somewhere between nine and twelve
percentage points (from roughly sixty to fifty percent) depending on the specific
timing of the survey.96 James Stoutenborough and his colleagues argue that, when
all other factors are taken into account, support for legalizing same-sex sex dropped
by eight percentage points in the immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court
decision.97 Support for civil unions likewise faltered right after Lawrence, dropping
nine points (from forty-nine to forty percent) in a set of Gallup polls conducted shortly
before and after the decision.98 These drops are significant, but they were also fairly
transient. Support for civil unions bounced back within a year. 99 Support for
decriminalization also began rebounding within a year of the decision, but it did not
reach its pre-Lawrence level until 2007.100
Conservative activists and political elites certainly deployed the decision in
their efforts to mobilize opposition to marriage equality. 101 In the immediate
aftermath of the decision, both LGBTQ activists and their adversaries painted
Lawrence as a revolutionary moment—akin to Roe v. Wade in terms of its ability to
fire up a countermovement. 102 William Rubenstein, for example, opined that
Lawrence would “mobilize opponents of same-sex marriage in ways we haven’t
seen.” 103 Yet it is hard to find much evidence that Lawrence actually changed
conservative tactics or resulted in significant new mobilization. The reinstitution of
96

97
98

99

100
101
102
103

Gallup conducted two polls shortly before Lawrence was announced and two more polls shortly after.
The question remained the same: “Do you think gay or lesbian relations between consenting adults
should or should not be legal?” In the survey fielded between May 5–7, 2003, sixty percent of
respondents thought gay and lesbian sex should be legal, while fifty-nine percent thought so in the May
19–21, 2003, survey. (The difference is substantively meaningless.) However, in the poll conducted from
July 18–20, 2003, only fifty percent of respondents said gay and lesbian sex should be legal; the July
25–27 polls produced a result of forty-eight percent. GALLUP, GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS (2016),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/Gay-Lesbian-Rights.aspx.
James W. Stoutenborough, Donald P. Haider-Markel, & Mahalley D. Allen, Reassessing the Impact of
Supreme Court Decisions on Public Opinion: Gay Civil Rights Cases, 59 POL. RES. Q. 419, 425 (2006).
Both polls asked respondents whether they would “favor or oppose a law that would allow homosexual
couples to legally form civil unions, giving them some of the legal rights of married couples?” Forty-nine
percent of respondents in the May 5–7, 2003, poll indicated that they supported civil unions. That
number dropped to forty percent in the July 25–27 poll. GALLUP, supra note 96.
A Gallup poll conducted from March 5–7, 2004, found that fifty-four percent of respondents supported
civil unions. This number dropped down to forty-nine percent in Gallup’s May 2–4, 2004 poll. There is
no obvious intervening event explaining this change. Results of both polls may well have been affected
by the November 2003 decision in Goodridge. By May 2004, many respondents may have seen civil
unions as a moderate compromise in the battle over marriage equality. GALLUP, supra note 96.
In a survey conducted from May 10–13, 2007, fifty-nine percent of respondents said that gay sex should
be legal. Id.
Sarah Kershaw, Adversaries on Gay Rights Vow State-by-State Fight, N. Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, at 8.
Id.
Id.
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sodomy laws had not been a focus of countermovement actors prior to Lawrence.104
And those actors had already been fighting to pass mini-DOMAs in states across the
nation. Thirty-two states had mini-DOMAs on the books by the end of 2002. In the
first five months of 2003—prior to the Lawrence decision—legislators in ten states
had introduced bills designed variously to expand existing mini-DOMA laws or to
create them in the first place. 105 The Federal Marriage Amendment was initially
introduced in the 107th Congress in May 2002, where it died in committee.106 It was
introduced again in May 2003—before Lawrence— but no hearings were held until
May 2004. Contemporaneous newspaper accounts indicate that scattered protests
occurred, but there was nothing large or sustained. 107 It appears as if anti-gay
adversaries largely utilized Lawrence to add weight to a set of claims they were
already making.
In sum, Lawrence was the catalyst for some changes. It temporarily decreased
popular support for both civil unions and the decriminalization of sodomy. It gave
anti-gay activists additional support for their contention that same-sex marriage was
an imminent threat. It also widened access to the federal courts by giving LGBTQ
activists a potentially powerful new doctrinal argument. But compared to Baehr or
Stonewall, it is hard to make a persuasive claim that Lawrence was a transformative
event. Winning Lawrence did not prompt LGBTQ organizations to expand or
otherwise significantly shift the scope of their activities; marriage equality had
already been added to their portfolio.108 Nor did it inspire a shift in organizational
forms. The Ad-Hoc Task Force had already morphed into the Litigator’s Roundtable,
which continued to meet after Lawrence. The case did not notably affect mobilization
104
105
106

107

108

Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 459 (2005).
Only the Texas bill was successful. See Kershaw, supra note 101.
The proposed text of the amendment read as follows: “Section 1. Marriage in the United States shall
consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution or the constitution of any
State, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents
thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.” H.R.J. Res 93, 107th Cong. (2d sess. 2002).
The amendment’s language was drafted by the Alliance for Marriage, Judge Robert Bork, and
Professors Robert P. George (Princeton) and Gerard V. Bradley (Notre Dame Law School). See Alan
Cooperman, Little Consensus on Marriage Amendment: Even Authors Disagree on the Meaning of Its
Text, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2004, at A01.
Jeffrey Rosen describes one protest in front of a federal courthouse in North Carolina in which a pastor
and about fifty of his followers arranged six coffins, each emblazoned with the name of a Supreme
Court decision representing what Rosen called “a defeat for social conservatives in the moral and
political clashes known as the culture wars.” The sixth coffin was inscribed with Lawrence’s name.
Jeffrey Rosen, How to Reignite the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, at 48.
During the course of the Lawrence litigation, LGBTQ rights activists “won” a marriage equality case in
Vermont and filed marriage equality suits in two other states: Massachusetts and New Jersey. Baker
v. State, the Vermont case, required that Vermont grant same-sex couples all the state-level rights and
benefits of marriage, but left it up to the legislature to determine whether marriage should be opened
to same-sex couples or whether an alternative institution should be devised. 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt.
1999). The legislature ultimately devised a separate institution, called civil unions. The Massachusetts
case was Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003), about which
there is more below. The New Jersey case was Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). In 2005, the
New Jersey Supreme Court issued a decision akin to Vermont’s Baker and the New Jersey legislature
followed Vermont’s lead is creating a separate institution for same-sex couples. Id. at 200.
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on behalf of LGBTQ rights. Perhaps it might have had wider effects, given more time
to percolate. But six months after the Supreme Court handed down Lawrence, a new
judicial decision dramatically altered the terms of debate surrounding LGBTQ rights,
pushing Lawrence into the background.
D. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health
On November 18, 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court handed
down Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, holding that the state’s refusal to
marry same-sex couples violated both the liberty and equality clauses of the
Massachusetts constitution. 109 On May 17, 2004, as a direct result of Goodridge,
Massachusetts became the first state in the nation to institute a formal regime of
marriage equality.110
Response to Goodridge was swift. The decision inspired widespread
mobilization with both supporters and opponents of the decision using the case as the
centerpiece of their efforts to re-frame the cultural and legal meaning of marriage. It
prompted the reconfiguration of elite alignments. It inspired a powerful new tactic to
fight for LGBTQ rights. And like Baehr, Goodridge served as a catalyst for
government repression through the passage of laws specifically designed to fence
same-sex couples out of marriage.
Among the most significant repercussions of Goodridge was this: within a year
of the decision, thirteen states had amended their constitutions to limit marriage to
different-sex couples.111 By the close of 2006, another ten states had added same-sex
marriage bans to their constitutions. 112 (The phrase “same-sex marriage” ban is
somewhat of a misnomer. Most of the amendments barred state recognition of any
formal legal status for same-sex couples.) Although state and national LGBTQ rights
groups mobilized to stop the bans, they were outmaneuvered by conservative groups,
who tapped into both a fear of activist judges and of the Goodridge decision to argue
that the bans were necessary to preserve “traditional” marriage. 113 Conservative
activists were extraordinarily successful: all but one of the state-level amendments
they backed passed—and by wide margins—ranging from a low of fifty-seven percent
109
110
111

112

113

798 N.E.2d 941.
Id.
The thirteen states that amended their constitutions were Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah.
Legislatures initiated the amendment process in seven states; citizen petition drives started the ball
rolling in the other six. ANDERSEN, supra note 46, at 234.
Louisiana and Texas amended their constitutions in 2005. Alabama, Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin amended their constitutions in 2006. See, e.g., Gay
Marriage Timeline, PEWFORUM.ORG (Apr. 1, 2008) http://www.pewforum.org/2008/04/01/gay-marriagetimeline/.
Katharine Q. Seelye, Conservatives Mobilize Against Ruling on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
2003. The Rev. Gene Mills, an Assemblies of God minister spearheading the charge for a constitutional
amendment in Louisiana, was very explicit about the framing strategies he employed: “We’re casting
this as: Either the people of Louisiana decide, or some federal or state court in another state decides.”
Alan Cooperman, Gay Marriage Ban in Mo. May Resonate Nationwide, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2004.
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(Oregon) to a high of eighty-six percent (Mississippi).114 These amendments clearly
and measurably affected the capacity of the LGBTQ rights movement to affect their
aims, both because the amendments closed off recourse to state constitutional claims
and because they increased the barriers to legislative or electoral passage of
relationship-recognition measures. LGBTQ rights activists would need to either
repeal the newly-enacted amendments or convince the Supreme Court to strike them
down as violating the federal constitution before the activists could try to win
relationship recognition policies.
Goodridge also prompted some elite political actors to come out in support of
marriage equality. In early 2004, San Francisco, Portland, Oregon, and a handful of
other localities began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, continuing to do
so until they were ordered to cease by courts, state attorneys general, and other
authoritative interpreters of state law. 115 These actions exposed the existence of
fissures in the prevailing political opportunity structure around LGBTQ rights,
indicating a new openness to the argument that same-sex couples were deserving of
legal protections. And, indeed, political elites in several localities took unprecedented
steps to indicate their openness to marriage equality in the aftermath of Goodridge.
The San Jose City Council, for instance, voted in March 2004 to recognize the samesex marriages of city employees. 116 Seattle’s mayor issued the same policy via
executive order. 117 And in April 2004 the Maine Legislature created a domestic
partnership registry establishing same-sex partners as next-of-kin for purposes of
medical decision-making, funeral arrangements, and inheritance.118
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision also indirectly triggered
the adoption of a new tactic in the LGBTQ rights movement: the wedding wave. When
San Francisco and Portland opened marriage to same-sex couples, the response was
extraordinary. Thousands of same-sex couples applied for licenses, waiting for hours,
days, and even weeks. By marrying, they put themselves and their relationships on
the front lines of a cresting debate over the meaning of marriage and the role of
lesbians and gay men in the American polity. They did so despite the evident legal,
political, and social instability surrounding same-sex marriage in both locales at the
time. Studies of the couples in both locations show that the weddings are
appropriately classed as protest actions: intentional episodes of claims-making by
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115
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The lone exception was a proposed amendment in Arizona, which appears to have been defeated
because voters feared that its wording was broad enough to remove state benefits from elderly,
unmarried couples. A more narrowly worded marriage ban passed by a wide margin in 2008. See, e.g.,
Stephanie Simon, South Dakota Scraps Abortion Bill, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006.
See generally DANIEL R. PINELLO, AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2006).
San Jose Recognizes Gay Marriage, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 10, 2004, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/200403-10/news/0403100284_1_gay-marriage-marriage-licenses-same-sex.
Claudia Rowe, Seattle Gays Go To Court After Wedding Licenses Denied, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Mar. 8, 2004, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Seattle-gays-go-to-court-after-wedding-licenses1138971.php.
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 2710 (2009).
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participants with a history of activism in a variety of other social movements. 119
Wedding waves became a prominent feature of the marriage equality movement and
lines of same-sex couples patiently waiting to marry and then emerging triumphantly
with marriage licenses in hand became some of the movement’s most iconic
imagery.120
In essence, Goodridge was a match lit above a tinderbox.121 As did Baehr before
it, the decision galvanized oppositional forces to lobby legislatures and conduct ballot
campaigns across the nation and thereby forced LGBTQ activists to spend significant
amounts of time and energy responding to the threat of incipient marriage
amendments. The success of counter-movements activists significantly shifted the
structure of political opportunities surrounding marriage equality, shutting off access
to state constitutional arguments and placing a huge new barrier in the way of
electoral and legislative tactics. But Goodridge also signaled a fracturing in the
alignment of political elites. While many legislative and executive branch actors
worked to create a moat around “traditional” marriage, some took actions to show
their support for at least some forms of relationship recognition, opening up
possibilities for gains in some locations even while shutting down progress in others.
This fracturing, in turn, triggered the creation of an iconic new tactic in the battle for
marriage equality: the wedding wave.

119
120
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Verta Taylor, Katrina Kimport, Nella Van Dyke & Ellen Ann Anderson, Culture and Mobilization:
Tactical Repertoires, Same-Sex Weddings, and the Impact on Gay Activism, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 865, 865–
90 (2009).
All of this on top of the fact that Goodridge expanded the legal definition of marriage in Massachusetts
to include same-sex relationships. There is indirect evidence to suggest that the sheer existence of
married same-sex couples may have helped shift cultural frames surrounding same-sex marriage. By
the end of 2004, more than 6,100 same-sex couples had married in Massachusetts. Over the next
several years, public support for marriage equality rose faster in Massachusetts than in other states.
See Andrew R. Flores & Scott Barclay, Public Support for Marriage for Same-sex Couples by State,
Williams Inst. (2013), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5640q32g.pdf; Andrew R. Flores & Scott Barclay,
Trends in Public Support for Marriage for Same-sex Couples by State: 2004-2014, WILLIAMS INST.
(2015), http://escholarship.org/uc/item/7d66v2mt.pdf (last visited Dec 30, 2016).
Moreover, the political furor in Massachusetts to subvert Goodridge abated significantly within two
years of the decision. In March 2004, state legislators had voted to begin the lengthy process of
amending the state’s constitution to limit marriage to different-sex couples while creating civil unions
for same sex couple. The proposed amendment passed by a vote of 105 to 92. In September 2005, when
the amendment came up for the required second vote, it failed by a margin of 157 to 39, after only two
hours of debate. According to media reports, many legislators had changed their mind about the
amendment after witnessing the impact, or lack thereof, of same-sex couples getting married. The
attitude shift of Senate Republican Leader Brian Lees, who had cosponsored the amendment in 2004, is
indicative: “Gay marriage has begun, and life has not changed for the citizens of the commonwealth,
with the exception of those who can now marry.” Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Rejects Bill Eliminate
Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005. Senate Majority Leader Frederick E. Berry was even more
succinct in explaining his change of heart. Said he, “There were no earthquakes.” Raphael Lewis, Key
Senators Break from Travaglini Amendment, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 7, 2005, http://www.boston.com/
local/articles/2005/09/07/key_senators_break_from_travaglini_amendment.
ANDERSEN, supra note 46, at 219.
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EVALUATING THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF THE SUPREME
COURT’S RECENT MARRIAGE JURISPRUDENCE

Between 2013 and 2015, the Supreme Court handed down two landmark
marriage equality decisions: United States v. Windsor122 and Obergefell v. Hodges.123
Windsor involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), which defined the words “marriage” and “spouse” to encompass only
heterosexual couplings for all purposes of federal law.124 The plaintiff in the case,
Edie Windsor, had been required to pay a significant estate tax after her wife died
because the Internal Revenue Service, citing Section 3, refused to grant her the estate
tax exemption available to heterosexual spouses. The Windsor majority ruled that
“the principal purpose and necessary effect of [Section 3] are to demean those persons
who are in a lawful same-sex marriage” 125 in violation of Fifth Amendment
guarantees. On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government
was required to recognize marriages between people of the same sex. The Windsor
majority ruled that “the principal purpose and necessary effect of [Section 3] are to
demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage”126 in violation of Fifth
Amendment guarantees.127
Two years to the day after deciding Windsor, the Supreme Court handed down
Obergefell v. Hodges, a challenge to the constitutionality of state laws barring samesex couples from marrying. Such laws, the Supreme Court ruled, violated the
fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 128 Justice Kennedy penned the majority decision, just as he had in
Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor. “Under the Constitution,” he wrote, “same-sex
122
123
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Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2675.
Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2584.
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 2(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 1738C (West. 1998).
U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2695. See also id. at 2695–96 (“DOMA singles out a class of persons
deemed by a State entitled to recognition and protection to enhance their own liberty. It imposes a
disability on the class by refusing to acknowledge a status the State finds to be dignified and proper.
DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact,
including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others.”)
Id. at 2695; See also id. at 2695–96 (“DOMA singles out a class of persons deemed by a State entitled to
recognition and protection to enhance their own liberty. It imposes a disability on the class by refusing
to acknowledge a status the State finds to be dignified and proper. DOMA instructs all federal officials,
and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own children, that their
marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others.”).
The same day it handed down Windsor, the Supreme Court sidestepped an opportunity to decide
whether state governments were required to recognize marriages between people of the same sex.
Hollingsworth v. Perry was a challenge to the constitutionality of Proposition 8, an amendment to
California’s constitution that expressly limited marriage to different-sex couples. 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013).
The Court dismissed the case on a procedural issue, finding that the party defending the
constitutionality of California’s amendment lacked standing to appeal the federal district court’s initial
ruling that the amendment was unconstitutional. The functional result was to bring marriage equality
to California, the nation’s most populous state. Two years later, in Obergefell, the Court would
definitively answer the question it ducked in Perry.
Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2597–605.
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couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it
would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this
right.”129
Obergefell was widely hailed as an extraordinary moment in the movement for
LGBTQ rights.130 At its most basic level, the ruling struck down marriage bans in the
thirteen states that still had them on the books. More broadly, it marked the
culmination of over twenty years of movement (and counter-movement) activism
around marriage equality, activism that had turned the concept of same-sex marriage
from an oxymoron to a reality.
But notwithstanding its obvious importance as both a legal matter and a social
movement success, can Obergefell be considered a transformative event? Did it
prompt a radical shift in the level or nature of mobilization, generate tactical
innovations, alter political consciousness, foster organizational change and/or
provoke changes in the configuration of elites, allies, and adversaries? Or is Obergefell
more like Lawrence v. Texas—a landmark ruling that marked the culmination of over
three decades of concerted efforts to vanquish sodomy laws but that did not catalyze
radical change in the trajectory of the larger LGBTQ rights movement?
My read of the evidence is that Obergefell is best understood as part of a larger
transformative event rather than as a singular event. Transformative events do not
need to operate at a singular moment in time. The Montgomery Bus Boycott, for
instance, took over a year from start to finish. The unfolding of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic throughout the 1980s is likewise seen as a transformative event for the
American LGBTQ rights movement, prompting as it did a radical shift in movement
priorities, the generation of new movement tactics, the mass mobilization of activists,
and the creation of new organizations. 131 I argue that Windsor and Obergefell
operated as the two end points of a singular transformative event rather than as two
separate events. In the pages to follow, I explain my reasoning.
From a social movement perspective, Windsor’s primary effect on the LGBTQ
rights movement was in providing a key of sorts with which to access the federal
courts. Prior to Windsor, the great majority of the LGBTQ rights groups had been
hesitant to bring a direct attack on the federal constitutionality of same-sex marriage
bans, worrying that if they pushed too far too fast they would lose. 132 Windsor
changed the calculus. Justice Kennedy’s rationale for striking down Section 3 of
DOMA provided powerful ammunition for arguing that state constitutional bans on
same-sex marriage were likewise unconstitutional. If a federal law refusing to
129

Id. at 2602.
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See supra text accompanying notes 4−11.
For examinations of the transformative effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on LGBTQ activism, see
generally Deborah B. Gould, Moving Politics: Emotion and ACT UP's Fight Against Aids (2009);
Gamson, supra note 45; Amin Ghaziani, Verta Taylor & Amy Stone, Cycles of Sameness and Difference
in LGBT Social Movements, ANNU. REV. SOCIOL. (2016),
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-soc-073014-112352.
Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 54; Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY
L.J. 663, 683–87 (2012).
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recognize same-sex marriages was demeaning to same-sex couples, surely state laws
limiting marriage to different-sex couples were also demeaning to same-sex couples.
If DOMA “instruct[ed] all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom samesex couples interact[ed], including their own children, that their marriage [was] less
worthy than the marriages of others,” 133 surely state constitutional bans did the
same.
Yet again, Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion laid out a roadmap for future litigation:
By formally declaring anyone opposed to same-sex marriage an enemy of human decency, the
majority arms well every challenger to a state law restricting marriage to its traditional
definition. Henceforth those challengers will lead with this Court’s declaration that there is
no legitimate purpose served by such a law, and will claim that the traditional definition has
the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure the personhood and dignity of same-sex
couples.134

After Windsor, Lambda Legal, Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders
(GLAD), the ACLU, LGBT Project, and the National Center for Lesbian Rights
(NCLR) moved quickly to do something they had never done before—file direct federal
challenges to the constitutionality of marriage bans. They were joined by same-sex
couples around the nation acting independently of any social movement
organizations. Within a year of the Windsor decision, every state marriage ban was
under legal attack.
These legal challenges were extraordinarily successful. The day Windsor was
handed down, twelve states and the District of Columbia had instituted (or were in
the process of instituting) marriage equality regimes.135 In the two years between
Windsor and Obergefell, twenty-four additional states opened marriage to same-sex
couples, all but two of them in direct response to judicial mandates. 136 The first
twenty courts to hear marriage equality challenges post-Windsor unanimously ruled
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U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
Id. at 2710. (Scalia, J., dissenting); See also id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting). “In my opinion, however,
the view that this Court will take of state prohibition of same-sex marriage is indicated beyond
mistaking by today’s opinion. As I have said, the real rationale of today’s opinion, whatever
disappearing trail of its legalistic argle-bargle one chooses to follow, is that DOMA is motivated by bare
desire to harm couples in same-sex marriages. How easy it is, indeed how inevitable, to reach the same
conclusion with regard to state laws denying same-sex couples marital status.” Id.
Judicial decisions had precipitated marriage in three of those states (Massachusetts, Connecticut and
Iowa). Voters in an additional three states had implemented marriage equality via the ballot
(Maryland, Washington, and Maine). Three states and the District of Columbia had instituted marriage
equality via legislative action (Vermont, New Hampshire, and New York). Three additional state
legislatures had voted to open marriage to same-sex couples prior to Windsor, but the laws did not go
into effect until after Windsor was decided.
Illinois and Hawaii passed marriage equality legislatively. New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah, Wisconsin, Virginia, Colorado, Kansas, Nevada, West Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Alaska, Idaho, Wyoming, Arizona, Montana, Florida, and Alabama all
opened marriage to same-sex couples in response to judicial decisions. I omit California from this list
because of its unique circumstances. See U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
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in favor of the same-sex couples bringing suit. 137 By the time the Supreme Court
accepted certiorari in Obergefell, more than forty courts had interpreted Windsor to
stand for the proposition that same-sex couples had a constitutional right to marry,
including the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. Only a handful of courts
disagreed.138 The Sixth Circuit was one of those courts; its decision would become the
vehicle for the Supreme Court to directly address the question of whether same-sex
couples had a constitutionally protected interest in marrying.139
On its own merits, then, Windsor, bears several markers of a transformative
event. It was the catalyst for a torrent of federal litigation. Some of this litigation was
spearheaded by LGBTQ rights organizations, who shifted their legal tactics for
pursuing marriage equality as a consequence of the potentially powerful new
doctrinal argument supplied by Windsor. Other litigation was brought by same-sex
couples acting independently, inspired by Windsor’s promise. These lawsuits were
overwhelmingly successful, suggesting that Windsor may have altered the legal
frames surrounding marriage so greatly that it shifted the configuration of judicial
elites with respect to the validity of same-sex marriage bans—although it is also
possible that judicial elites would have interpreted the federal Constitution to require
marriage equality even in the absence of Windsor.140
Other post-Windsor shifts in the trajectory of the LGBTQ rights movement,
however, are more appropriately attributed to the Windsor-Obergefell line of cases
than to Windsor alone. Legislative data, for instance, indicate that Windsor and its
progeny triggered a shift in strategy by opponents of marriage equality. In the
immediate aftermath of Windsor, adversaries began pushing for the passage of socalled marriage refusal bills. These bills varied in their specifics. Some permitted
public officials to opt out of performing marriages or issuing marriage licenses based
on religious beliefs.141 Others allowed commercial and/or religious entities to refuse
to provide wedding-related services based on religious beliefs. 142 Marriage refusal
137
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The specific claims raised varied from case to case. In some instances, plaintiffs argued that they had a
constitutional right to marry e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (2013). In others, plaintiffs
argued that the state must recognize marriage licenses from out of state. E.g., Bourke v. Beshear, 996
F. Supp. 2d 542 (2014). One case revolved around whether Ohio had to recognize a valid same-sex
marriage on a death certificate. E.g., Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F Supp 2d 968 (2013).
See Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910 (2014)(District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana); Borman v. Pyles-Borman, No. 2014CV36, 2014 WL 4251133, at 1* (Tenn. Cir. Ct. 2014);
Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla, 54 F. Supp. 3d 157 (2014)(District Court for Puerto Rico).
See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F. 3d 388 (2014), the Sixth Circuit consolidated and reversed pro-marriage
equality decisions from four states within the circuit: Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee.
Windsor also indirectly affected the positions of scattered political elites. Governor Tom Corbett of
Pennsylvania, for instance, was an opponent of marriage equality who had vowed to defend
Pennsylvania’s marriage ban against constitutional attack. However, he ultimately chose not to appeal
a lower court ruling striking down the ban in light of Winds. Jon Delano, Gov. Corbett Won't Appeal
Same-Sex Marriage Case, CBS NEWS (2014),
http://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2014/05/21/gov-corbett-wont-appeal-same-sex-marriage-case//.
The ACLU keeps an updated list of marriage refusal bills. ACLU Marriage Refusal Bills,
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bills were introduced in three states in 2013,143 four states in 2014,144 sixteen states
in 2015, 145 and twenty-four states in 2016. 146 While Windsor may have been the
catalyst for the earliest bills, later bills were likely a response to Windsor’s progeny;
the great majority of the bills came from states where marriage equality was the
product of the Windsor-Obergefell line of cases.
The Windsor-Obergefell line of cases may also have prompted opponents of
LGBTQ rights to re-center their efforts from fighting to maintain a particular
conception of marriage and toward fighting to maintain a particular conception of
gender. Organized efforts to derail laws protecting individuals from discrimination
on the basis of gender identity became more prominent after Windsor.147 In late 2014,
for example, Houston voters repealed a new city ordinance expanding
antidiscrimination protections to transgender people. In early 2015, citizens in
Springfield, Missouri took to the ballot box to repeal a newly-enacted ordinance
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.148
Bills to repeal state and local measures prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
gender identity were introduced in two states in 2015149 and thirteen states during
the first half of 2016.150 Rhetoric about the dangers of laws prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of gender identity commonly focused on transgender bathroom usage,
with a particular emphasis on the specter of sex predators in sex-segregated
spaces.151
Evidence of a direct link between the increased focus on “bathroom bills” and
the Windsor-Obergefell line of cases is circumstantial at this point; correlation is not
causation. But the shift makes intuitive sense. As Tina Fetner has detailed,
conservative groups seized the issue of same-sex marriage in the 1990s because they
saw it as “an issue with strong cultural resonance and popular support,” one that
would galvanize a broad constituency opposed to “changing one of the nation’s most
143
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cherished and emotionally laden institutions.”152 With the Windsor-Obergefell cases
taking marriage largely off the table, opponents of LGBTQ rights needed another
focus to mobilize their base. Bathroom bills were an obvious choice. As Schilt and
Westbrook detail, the historical conflation of transgender people with sexual
predators combined with the widespread belief that women and children are
vulnerable subjects who need protection from predatory men make measures that
permit transgender people to access sex-segregated spaces particularly fraught. As
with same-sex marriage in the 1990s, bathroom bills are an “issue with strong
cultural resonance and popular support.”153
At issue here is not whether opponents shifted focus to bathroom bills when
same-sex marriage lost its utility: they did. It is whether this shift can be directly
linked to the Windsor-Obergefell line of cases rather than, say, the increasing public
support for marriage equality. A full answer will require access to the internal
deliberation of opposition groups, access that is not available now—and may never be
available. The suddenness of the shift from mobilizing against marriage equality to
mobilizing against laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender identity
after Windsor-Obergefell, however, offers strong circumstantial evidence of the cases’
importance.
Another shift in the trajectory of the LGBTQ rights movement is clearly
attributable to Obergefell itself, namely a change in the organizational field
surrounding LGBTQ rights. Freedom to Marry—the most visible marriage equality
group and a major funder of various marriage equality campaigns—shut its doors in
February 2016. The choice was deliberate. Evan Wolfson, the organization’s
president, announced that Freedom to Marry would discontinue operations in a New
York Times op-ed piece published the same day the Court decided Obergefell.154 Statelevel Freedom to Marry groups also closed down155 as did the American Foundation
for Equal Rights, an organization formed with the specific goal of sponsoring
Hollingsworth v. Perry, the challenge to the constitutionality of California’s marriage
ban. 156 At least one LGBTQ rights group with a wider portfolio of interests also
disbanded in the aftermath of Obergefell: Empire State Pride Agenda, a New Yorkcentered advocacy group. 157 Empire State Pride Agenda noted in a press
announcement that “fundraising challenges naturally coincide with mission
victories,” but it stressed that its decision was “mission-driven rather than being
152
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about whether or not the Pride Agenda can remain fiscally solvent.” 158 Equality
Maryland, however, directly cited budget shortfall issues when announcing that the
organization would stay open but sharply curtail its operations in the aftermath of
Obergefell.159
This shift in the organizational field surrounding LGBTQ rights raise
questions that we do not yet have the data to answer but that will speak more fully
to Obergefell’s radiating effects. To what extent has winning marriage equality
hampered the ability of LGBTQ advocacy groups to raise funds? Lambda Legal listed
contributions totaling roughly $16.2 million in 2014 while the Human Rights
Campaign reported roughly $28.8 million. Will they be able to maintain the
enthusiasm of their donors now that marriage equality has largely disappeared as an
issue around which to raise funds? 160 Their capacity for mobilizing donors in the
absence of marriage equality may well determine which groups survive and which do
not.
In a related vein, will the activists who fought so hard to win marriage equality
turn their efforts to other important issues facing LGBTQ people, including the need
to secure protections from discrimination in employment, housing, and public
accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity? Will they
instead turn their efforts to other causes? Or will they recede to private life? The fight
for marriage equality was, in its later years, an emotionally compelling issue for many
“ordinary” LGBTQ people, as the persistence of weddings waves indicates. Will those
people demobilize now in Obergefell’s aftermath? The answers to these questions will
color our assessment of Obergefell’s ultimate impact on the LGBTQ rights movement.
No matter the answers to these questions, however, it seems clear that the
Windsor-Obergefell line of cases should be classified as a transformative event in the
LGBTQ rights movement. Windsor dramatically changed the terms of the debate
around marriage equality. It prompted a change in tactics by the major LGBTQ
litigation organizations and unleashed a torrent of litigation, litigation that was
overwhelmingly successful. Windsor might have shifted the configuration of judicial
elites with respect to the issue of marriage equality or it may simply have made
visible a shift that had already taken place. In either event, in the two years between
Windsor and Obergefell, marriage equality advanced rapidly across the nation, a
stunning cascade of shifts in the legal status of same-sex couples. The WindsorObergefell line of cases in turn prompted tactical shifts among opponents of LGBTQ
rights. It sparked a rear-guard action in the form of a new emphasis on marriage
refusal bills. It may well have prompted opponents to develop a new target: laws that
prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity, particularly in the context of
158
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sex-segregated spaces. Obergefell, in turn, has already triggered shifts in the
organizational field surrounding LGBTQ rights and may well have additional
radiating effects over time.
It is also worth noting that the Windsor-Obergefell line of cases radically
changed the lived experiences of same-sex couples—and their children—in every
state in the nation. Windsor gave legally married same-sex couples access to the
plethora of federal rights, benefits, and protections of federal law. Obergefell, together
with the torrent of judicial decisions occurring in Windsor’s shadow, opened legal
marriage up to same-sex marriage in thirty-seven states. These marriages gave samesex couples who chose to enter into them all the state-level rights, benefits, and
protections of marriage in addition to the federal protections guaranteed by Windsor.
This is no small change. The legal consequences of marriage encompass a very
broad range of economic and familial issues.161 But the meaning of marriage extends
far beyond its practical legal effects. Marriage means many things, so many that the
term is difficult to define in any holistic sense. It is both a status and a contract, both
public and private. 162 It has religious and cultural significance. It is intimately
connected to American conceptions of citizenship, both historically and in the modern
day.163 It is a source of identity and social status.164 Weddings are rituals that evoke
meanings beyond the event itself. 165 Among other things, they are a key rite of
passage into adulthood in the modern Western context. 166 They stimulate moral
attachment to the existing social order through the iterative and collective expression
of social values and emotions.167 They are also the centerpiece of what Ann Swidler
calls the “mythic culture of love;” the moment when “true love” is affirmed by the
joining together of two individuals who will, in the most perfect form of the myth, live
happily ever after.168
The Windsor-Obergefell line of cases gave same-sex couples across the nation
access to marriage in all these dimensions. And that may be the most transformative
effect of all.
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CONCLUSION
The great bulk of scholarship examining the relationship between judicial
decisions and social movement progress has focused on the wisdom and utility of
turning to litigation as a mechanism for achieving social change. I take a different
approach in this article. I am interested in exploring the capacity of judicial decisions
to create turning points in the trajectory of social movements.
Social movements can be conceptualized as a concatenation of events: protest
actions, meetings, boycotts, lawsuits, lobbying, the creation of new organizations, the
dissolution of organizations, and so on. These events mark, shape, and sustain social
movements and as they accumulate they can have powerful effects. The great
majority of these events are what we might term ordinary or regular—part of the
standard ebb and flow of social movements. On rare occasion, however, a singular
event—or a closely connected series of events—can radically alter the capacity of a
social movement to effect social change. Social movement scholars refer to these
events as transformative events.
Intriguingly, for all its use as a concept, a more precise definition of
transformative events remain elusive. Social movement scholars have primarily
interested themselves in the capacity of transformative events to dramatically shift
mobilization levels among a movement’s adherents. Yet existing scholarship makes
it clear that transformative events can have effects ranging far beyond individual
mobilization. On an individual level, transformative events can dramatically increase
mobilization—or demobilization. On a group level, they can prompt the creation of
new organizations—or the collapse of existing ones. They can spark new alliances or
damage existing ones. They can spark major changes in strategies and tactics. Such
group-level effects can spread to the universe of movement adversaries as well. On a
structural level, transformative events can dramatically alter the political
opportunity structure within which a movement operates, variously opening up or
closing down windows for action. Transformative events can also dramatically affect
the capacity of social movements to frame their arguments in ways that are culturally
persuasive. One of the aims of this article has been to specify the multiple ways that
transformative events can affect the trajectories of social movements.
Social movement scholars have shown that many different types of events have
the capacity to be transformative, but they have not yet examined judicial decisions
as a potential type of transformative event. This article fills that gap. I draw on six
judicial decisions involving LGBTQ rights to reach this conclusion: four US Supreme
Court decisions (Romer v. Evans, Lawrence v. Texas, United States v. Windsor and
Obergefell v. Hodges) and two decisions from state courts of last resort (Hawaii’s
Baehr v. Lewin and Massachusetts’ Goodridge v. Department of Public Health). My
reason for choosing these cases to examine was simple: I picked cases that were
widely described as landmarks, turning points, or watersheds in the movement for
LGBTQ rights.
My findings show that judicial decisions can indeed catalyze radical change in
the trajectory of a social movement, change that measurably alters the capacity of a
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social movement to effect its aims in a fashion that is dramatic, enduring, and
proximate to the decision itself. Baehr and Goodridge clearly operated as pivots in
the trajectory of the LGBTQ rights movement. Baehr dramatically changed the terms
of the debate around LGBTQ rights, forcing rights groups to reorder their priorities
to accommodate the goal of marriage equality. The decision sparked the creation of
new activist nodes within the movement and sparked mobilization, particularly
among opponents of marriage equality. Baehr also served as the catalyst for
government repression, as opponents of marriage equality successfully promoted the
passage of laws specifically designed to stymie the progress of the LGBTQ rights
movement.
Goodridge shared several features in common with Baehr. Like Baehr,
Goodridge galvanized opponents of LGBTQ rights, who moved quickly to lobby states
to amend their constitutions to fence same-sex couples out of marriage. The passage
of state-level constitutional amendments in turn placed significant new hurdles in
the path of activists seeking marriage equality. But Goodridge also revealed a new
fracture in the alignment of political elites. Political actors in several localities took
steps to show their support for marriage equality. Most prominently, San Francisco
and Multnomah County, Oregon, began permitting same-sex couples to obtain
marriage licenses, a practice they continued until forced to desist by state courts. This
fracturing opened up possibilities for rights gains in some locations even while other
locations were actively working to stem the possibility of relationship recognition for
same-sex couples. It also triggered the creation of an iconic new tactic in the battle
for LGBTQ rights: the wedding wave.
In both Baehr and Goodridge then, the effects of a judicial ruling radiated far
beyond the courtroom walls, with measurable, proximate, significant, and enduring
consequences for the LGBTQ rights movement. Although the reverberations of the
Windsor-Obergefell line of cases cannot yet be fully measured, it is already evident
that these cases have also altered the trajectory of the LGBTQ rights movement. The
Windsor-Obergefell cases share several similarities with Baehr. Both dramatically
changed the terms of the debate around LGBTQ rights. Both provoked tactical shifts
among LGBTQ rights organizations as well as opponents of LGBTQ rights. And both
inspired changes in the organizational field surrounding LGBTQ rights, with Baehr
acting as the impetus for the creation of new activist nodes and Obergefell acting as
the impetus for several LGBTQ rights groups to close their doors. The most obvious
distinction between the two transformative events is also worth noting. Baehr
marked the emergence of a major new battleground in the struggle over LGBTQ
rights; Obergefell marked its successful resolution.
My findings also show that landmark decisions are not, in and of themselves,
transformative events. Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas are inarguably
important moments both in terms of the progress of the LGBTQ rights movement and
in terms of the development of equal protection (Romer) and privacy law (Lawrence).
Romer was the first Supreme Court case to position lesbians and gay men as worthy
of protection under the Equal Protection Clause—and the first to recognize and
repudiate anti-gay animus as a legitimate basis for law-making. Lawrence marked
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the final victory in a decades-long battle to decriminalize consensual same-sex
relations, thereby cutting the legs out from under a pervasive argument for denying
rights to LGBTQ people: their supposed criminality.
But there is little empirical evidence that either case actually changed the
trajectory of the LGBTQ rights movement in a significant, measurable, and enduring
fashion. I find no evidence that winning either case generated major changes in the
organizational forms, capacities, or tactics of major LGBTQ organizations. Nor did
losing these cases appear to significantly alter the tactics of opposition activists.
There is no persuasive evidence that Romer or Lawrence affected levels of individual
mobilization.
The cases certainly did suggest an increasing level of judicial receptivity to
LGBTQ rights claims. They also gave LGBTQ rights litigators new legal arguments
to add to their arsenal, which they quickly did. But this seems insufficient, in and of
itself, to categorize a judicial decision as transformative. Compare Romer and
Lawrence to Windsor. All three decisions indicated judicial receptivity to an LGBTQ
rights claims and all three decisions gave LGBTQ rights activists access to powerful
new legal arguments. Only Windsor engendered measurable levels of additional legal
mobilization by individual activists. Only Windsor inspired tactical shifts among
LGBT rights organizations. And only Windsor prompted opponents of LGBTQ rights
to turn to new strategies to limit rights gains. There is no one defining criterion of a
transformative event, a definitional imprecision that inevitably leads to arguments
about marginal cases. I have proceeded from the assumption that events that inspire
wider and more dramatic changes in the trajectory of a social movement fall more
obviously into the class of transformative events. From this perspective, Romer and
Lawrence have little claim to be considered transformative events.
I want to make it clear that I am not making the claim that transformative
events are the sole or even the most important engine of social change.
Transformative events are outliers. They are only a tiny proportion of all the events
that occur over the course of a movement and to place undue emphasis on them at
the cost of the quieter work of social movements risks a distorted understanding of
what social movements do and how and why they progress in the particular way that
they do. On the other hand, to ignore transformative events is to miss the fact that
there are, on occasion, moments that can fundamentally shift the trajectory of social
movements. The Windsor-Obergefell line of cases—and Baehr and Goodridge before
it—is one such moment.

